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In his excellent and thought-provoking essay, Michael Ignatieff plays
Aristotle to his own former Plato. Aristotle felt his teacher Plato had aimed
too high in believing in a singular and transcendent good. Not only are goods
plural, however, Aristotle contended. They are practically realized through
virtues of character, rather than discerned by philosophers who theoretically
rise to a vision beyond deceptive appearance and lived excellence.
Of course, the human rights movement has long known that goods
are plural: it disaggregates the different fundamental entitlements so as
to enumerate a list of high-priority expectations that are independently
demanding, not supposed to be traded off against one another, let alone against
other values. Rather, it is the notion that human rights are transcendent norms
to displace local practical activity and the personal excellence of character that
now seems unconvincing to Ignatieff, once perhaps the most visible spokesman
for the importance of human rights in global affairs. "Side by side," he writes,
"sits a very different moral system that is not easily squared with human
rights principles, because these virtues privilege the local over the universal;
the citizen over the stranger; and the community over the cosmopolitan."
It is not at all that Ignatieff is giving up on human rights, any more than
Aristotle gave up on moral philosophy or high expectations. But after his
world travels, it does not seem to Ignatieff that human rights are likely to
be much more widely shared and popularly lived than they now are. So at
the price of accepting some limits, human rights must coexist with more local
and practical ethical systems that reach the ground and run deep in people's
behavior. Cosmopolitanism cannot displace the difference of community and
states but must live with them and keep them in bounds. The global faces
the challenge of inevitable local variation that it can never unify around one
selfsame set of expectations.
But how big a concession the move from global universalism to local
virtue involves really depends on how big the gap is between them. Virtue
from Aristotle onward has generally been understood as the attempt to live
out the universal in particular settings and situations, not to leave it behind
altogether. The transactional ethics that Ignatieff describes as "taking people
one at a time" does not necessarily rule out the application of universal
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principles. It may just imply that those universal principles require local
translation and specific application. Second, insofar as local virtue works
well in this fashion, while also accommodating the diversity of cultures and
histories, it is unnecessary to worry about checking it from outside. Ignatieff
envisions human rights as "designed to constrain local partiality to one's own
community," but then the question is how much correction and constraint
virtue requires. In sum, if local virtue is relatively convergent with what
human rights already demand, because it is the particularization of universal
principles or provides a different path to the same goal, then there are few
problems. Aristotle has simply adjusted Plato for the real world.
But Ignatieff is worried that he needs to go further. For all his globetrotting
experiences of virtue in action, Ignatieff' s text suggests that he has been
disabused of people's capacity to adjust their current practices mainly
because of how they have treated strangers in the Syrian refugee crisis. For
all the talk of the memory of horror and the imperative of human rights in
Europe, its citizens have not succeeded in meeting the universal morality
which they themselves propounded now that needy Muslims fleeing civil
war are massed at their gates. And insofar as Europeans sometimes go farther
in taking in needy foreigners, Ignatieff says, it is not because they feel the
moral obligations of humanity but because local virtue prompts the free gift
of charity. In turn, Ignatieff surmises, celebrating this generosity may depend
not only on recognizing the role of local morality in all of its different forms,
but also people's need to condition it on the right to limit that generosity, to
affirm their territorial sovereignty, and to exdude as much as they welcome.
Yet the truth is that, unlike when it comes to freedom from torture, human
rights law generally does not accord a right to movement to people who want
to exercise it, so hospitality to strangers has to be a gift extended to them on
their own terms (except when they succeed in presenting themselves at the
border and claim asylum, which in turn depends on a well-founded fear of
persecution for specific reasons). Indeed, most of human rights law is not about
how states treat strangers (to whom they have few obligations in any case
under current law) but rather how they treat their own citizens. And we don't
want them abstaining from vile practices like torture simply because doing
so speaks to charitable impulses. If local virtue is defective not because it fails
to offer gifts to far-flung outsiders but because it does not grant entitlements
to fellow citizens, then Ignatieff's move to virtue is going to look extremely
unappealing. A world in which people debate about how many gifts to give to
people in need outside their homes is perfectly compatible with one in which
practices like child abuse and wife-beating have been banned within them. In
this sense, Ignatieff's critique motivated by concern for refugees would prove
really troubling mainly if it turned out that the same doubts he sees Europeans
expressing about strangers were true applied across the board. Once again, it
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is important to know how divergent ordinary virtue is from human rights to
know how to take Ignatieff's conclusions.
The real crisis of human rights, one far deeper than the heartrending fate
of refugees had made plain, is that moral precepts and practices around the
world remain very far from what human rights and other emancipatory values
demand. Virtue has never been strong on its own, and it needs cultivation, or
people will not live well. In a sense, Ignatieff isn't taking Aristotle seriously
enough. Aristotle recognized that our primary attitude towards virtue has
to be to inculcate it, not merely to see how differently it functions compared
to transcendent principles. And even Aristotle failed to realize how the right
social context is needed for virtue to be honed.
In our rush to celebrate human rights law and globalize it, it proved too
easy to slip into bouts of congratulating ourselves for our own virtue and
imposing it on others that we never have faced how hard the challenge of
changing morality globally really is. Having become so visible championing
human rights a couple of decades ago, Ignatieff, I am worrying, may have given
up too soon on human rights in the face of adversity. But neither enthusiasm
nor defeatism is the right move. For what we have learned in the meantime
is that virtue does not arrive by magic or materialize overnight, and certainly
not through grandstanding or imposition. Most important, virtue has social
foundations that liberals have not spent enough time figuring out how to lay
the world over.
In the face of an age that will be remembered not so much for its human
rights revolution as for the erosion of social solidarity welfare states once
created (though across only a part of the globe), it is tough to imagine people
finding their way to treat one another-let alone foreigners-virtuously.
Populism is significant not only for outsiders who are treated callously but also
for insiders who have no recourse when majorities wrest power from elites
they feel have betrayed them. And in a highly unequal world, the geopolitical
setting for transnational virtue is also a distant aspiration. Building institutions
that will better allow transcendent values to be available in and lived out
through virtuous practices -not a choice between our highest values and the
diversity of humanity-is thus what matters most.
